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Abstract
Finite sets of market data may not suffice to determine Pareto-improving
policies.
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When competitive markets fail to exhaust gains from trade, the question
arises whether it is possible to design policies that induce a Pareto improve-
ment. The transfer paradox, introduced by Leontieff,1 illustrates the difficul-
ties implicit in policy design: without information about fundamentals that
are unobservable, such as individual preferences, the prediction of the welfare
effects of economic policy is far from obvious.
The theory of general equilibrium with incomplete markets argues that
the problem of policy identification is, indeed, of interest: Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis (1986) showed that, when individuals face uninsurable risks,
there exist, typically, policies of asset reallocation (which subjects the design
of the policy to the same financial constraints that bind the individuals in
the competitive market) that make every individual in the economy ex-ante
better off.2
Early literature on the empirical structure imposed by the competitive
equilibrium hypothesis at the aggregate level was understood to imply that
the difficulties associated with the identification of Pareto-improving poli-
cies were insurmountable: the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem3 was
understood to imply that no information about individual (unobservable)
preferences could be elicited from aggregate data.
Very perceptively, however, Brown and Matzkin (1990 and 1996) intro-
duced an element that was missing in the discussion of the empirical impli-
cations of the competitive equilibrium model: the effects of perturbations to
individual endowments yield testable restrictions on the graph of the equi-
librium correspondence of a standard exchange economy. This idea was ex-
ploited by Chiappori et al (2004), Matzkin (2005) and Carvajal and Riascos
1Leontieff (1936). Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994) stated the paradox in a general
setting; Turner (2004) finds bounds on the amount of trade that is required, at equilibrium,
for the transfer paradox to arise.
2This result, which had been suggested by Stiglitz (1982), was later refined by Citanna
et al. (1998) and it was extended to other types of policy by Citanna et al. (2001).
3Sonnenschein (1974), Mantel (1974), Debreu (1974); see also Mas-Colell (1977).
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(2005), to show that, in economies without uncertainty, the graph of the
equilibrium correspondence can be used to identify individual preferences.
The argument for identification extends to economies with uncertainty
and an incomplete asset market, as was shown by Ku¨bler et al (2002) and
Carvajal and Riascos (2006); but the extension requires the observation of
relatively open subsets of the graph of the correspondence.
Here, we show that finite data sets of equilibrium information may be
insufficient for the identification of Pareto improving policies, let alone of
preferences. We restrict our attention to the types of policies considered
by the original argument of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), and
show that finite data sets need not suffice for the identification of individual
marginal utilities of income in different states of the world.
The intuition for this failure of identification of Pareto-improving asset
reallocations is straightforward: Pareto-improving policies exist when mar-
ket incompleteness allows the vectors of marginal utilities of revenue across
states of the world of different individuals to diverge from co-linearity even
at equilibrium. But, with vectors of marginal utilities of revenue that are
neither identified nor collinear, Pareto-improving policies are unclear: on the
basis of observed data, a profile of preferences in which the policy leaves at
least one individual worse off cannot be ruled out.
1 Not everything will do
Consider a finite, two-period economy with uncertainty. Suppose that there
are I individuals, S states of nature and L commodities, with commodity 1
acting as nume`raire, and that there are A < S linearly independent nume`raire
assets. Denote asset payoffs in state s by rs ∈ RA.
Let U be the class of all strongly concave and strictly monotone C2 func-
tions v : RL++ → R.
2
For individual i, contingent on state s, endowments are eis À 0 and
preferences are uis ∈ U . There is no date-zero consumption, so a consumption
plan is x = (xs)
S
s=1. Ex-ante preferences are U
i(x) =
∑S
s=1 u
i
s(xs).
Let ps ∈ P = {p ∈ RL++ : p1 = 1} be commodity prices contingent on
state s, and let p = (ps)
S
s=1. Denote asset prices by q, and let z
i be individual
i’s portfolio of assets.
If (q, p, (zi, xi)Ii=1) is a financial markets equilibrium of this economy,
then, generically in the space of economies, there exists a redistribution of
individual asset holdings that makes every individual in the economy ex-
ante better off (Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis, 1986). That is, for some
(dzi)Ii=1, with
∑
i dz
i = 0, it is true that, for all i, dU i =
∑
i du
i
s > 0, where
duis is the (spot) general equilibrium welfare effect resulting from revenue
transfers (rsdz
j)Ij=1 at spot equilibrium (ps, (x
j
s)
I
j=1) in exchange economy
(ujs, e
j
s + rsz
j(1, 0, ..., 0))Ij=1.
Suppose that, after asset markets have closed, a planner who knows the
asset market and who has observed asset prices, q, and individual portfolios,
(zi)Ii=1, but who does not know the fundamentals of the economy, namely
state-contingent endowments and preferences, attempts to design one such
asset redistribution. From an application of the transfer paradox, it follows,
with minor qualifications, that this task is impossible: the appropriate policy
is not identified from observation of data from the asset markets alone.
Proposition 1. Information from asset markets does not identify Pare- to-
improving policies. Let (dzi)Ii=1 be an asset redistribution:
∑
i dz
i = 0); if
for each state there is at least one individual whose income and utility are
perturbed (namely, rsdz
i 6= 0 and duis 6= 0), then there exists an alternative
ex-ante economy, ((u˜is, e˜
i
s)
S
s=1)
I
i=1, that
1. cannot be ruled out on the basis of observed data: this economy has a
financial markets equilibrium, (q˜, p˜, (z˜i, x˜i)Ii=1), that is consistent with
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the observed data in the sense that q˜ = q and, for every individual,
z˜i = zi; and
2. yields the opposite welfare effects for the given policy: letting U˜ i(x) =∑
s u˜
i
s(xs), the ex-ante welfare effects of the given policy are, for each
individual i, dU˜ i = −dU i.4
Proof. By construction, for each individual i, contingent on state s, marginal
utility of revenue is λis > 0 such that Du
i
s(x
i
s) = λ
i
sps, while for some λ
i
0 > 0,∑
s λ
i
srs = λ
i
0q. Also, psx
i
s = pse
i
s + rsz
i and qzi = 0.
Define bis = − 1λisdu
i
s. For each s, since
∑
i dz
i = 0, it follows that
∑
i b
i
s =
0 and, hence, by Donsimoni and Polemarchakis (1994), there exists an ex-
change economy (f is ∈ U , ωis À rszi(1, 0, ..., 0))Ii=1 and a pair (p˜s, (x˜is)Ii=1)
such that (i) (p˜s, (x˜
i
s)
I
i=1) is (spot) equilibrium for economy (f
i
s, ω
i
s)
I
i=1; (ii)
Df is(x˜
i
s) = p˜s; and (iii) as a consequence of revenue transfer (dω
i
1,s = rsdz
i)Ii=1,
spot welfare effects are df is = b
i
s.
Define u˜is(x) = λ
i
sf
i
s(x) and e˜
i
s = ω
i
s − rszi(1, 0, ..., 0).
By construction, p˜se˜
i
s+rsz
i = p˜sω
i
s and Du˜
i
s(x˜
i
s) = λ
i
sp˜s. Also,
∑
s λ
i
srs =
λi0q,
∑
i x˜
i
s =
∑
i e˜
i
s and
∑
i z
i = 0, so (q, p˜, (zi, x˜i)Ii=1) is a financial markets
equilibrium for the alternative economy.
On the other hand, for each s,
∑
s
du˜is =
∑
s
λisdf
i
s =
∑
s
λisb
i
s = −
∑
s
λis
duis
λis
= −
∑
s
duis.
Hence, for a given asset reallocation, all the information available from
the markets that have actually been open fails to distinguish the true econ-
4For dU˜ i, let du˜is be the (spot) general equilibrium welfare effect, for individual i,
resulting from revenue transfers (rsdzj)Ij=1 at spot equilibrium (p˜s, (x˜
j
s)
I
j=1) in exchange
economy (u˜js, e˜js + rszj(1, 0, ..., 0))Ij=1, and let dU˜
i =
∑
s du˜
i
s.
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omy from an alternative one in which the same reallocation has the opposite
welfare effects. In particular, the information does not distinguish an econ-
omy in which the policy is Pareto-improving from one in which it is Pareto
impairing.5
This basic result is subject to criticism if it is plausible to assume that
a planner may have available information from commodity markets for: (i)
multiple equilibria of the economy, or (ii) a longer history of observed data.
2 Multiple observations
Suppose now that, after asset markets have closed, when the asset redistribu-
tion is to be designed, the planner knows not only the prices and quantities of
the markets that have been open, but also future state-contingent commodity
prices, individual endowments and individual consumption plans. Suppose,
furthermore, that multiple observations are available. When this data set
is sufficiently rich so as to allow identification of individual income effects,
Ku¨bler et al (2002) and Carvajal and Riascos (2006) have shown that, under
regularity conditions, unobserved fundamentals, namely preferences, can be
recovered. In order to identify income effects, however, these arguments re-
quire the observation of relatively open subsets of the equilibrium manifold,
which rules out the possibility of finite data sets. The question we address
here is whether finite data allow for identification of policies, even if not of
preferences.
Suppose that there are T observations: a data set is a sequence of prices
from all markets, individual plans for all variables, and individual endow-
5It should be noticed that this analysis assumes that individual endowments are un-
known. This is necessary in the argument only for the purpose of satisfying nonnegativity
constraints, and neither the fact that observed prices are part of a financial equilibrium
for the constructed economy, nor the fact that welfare effects go in opposite directions for
both economies depend on the exact value of the constructed endowments.
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ments in all states, (qt, pt, (zi,t, xi,t, ei,t)Ii=1)
T
t=1.
6 Assume that xi,ts À 0 and
xi,t
′
s 6= xi,ts , when t′ 6= t, for every i, every t and every s.
Suppose that after asset markets have closed for the economy with en-
dowments (ei,T )Ii=1, and the observed equilibrium is (q
T , pT , (zi,T , xi,T )Ii=1),
a Pareto-improving asset redistribution has to be designed. Suppose that
it is known that every observation in the data set reflects financial markets
equilibrium: for all t, it is known that (qt, pt, (zi,t, xi,t)Ii=1) is an equilibrium
for the economy with endowments (ei,t)Ii=1. Suppose also that, for every s,
(pTs , (x
i,T
s )
I
i=1) is a regular equilibrium of (spot) economy (u
i
s, e
i,T
s + rsz
i,T )Ii=1.
We next show that if individual preferences are unknown, with some qual-
ification, even all this information fails to identify Pareto-improving policies:
one can find a second profile of preferences, also consistent with the data,
with the property that any policy that is Pareto-improving in the first pro-
file makes at least one consumer worse-off if real preferences are the second
profile.
Denote by λi,ts > 0 the marginal utility of revenue for individual i in state
s, for the t-th observation on the data set. By definition, Duis(x
i,t
s ) = λ
i,t
s p
t
s.
Also, let λi,t0 > 0 such that
∑
s λ
i,t
s rs = λ
i,t
0 q
t.
Proposition 2. Suppose that for every individual, i, there exists a solution
((ki,t > 0)Tt=1, ((µ
i,t
s )
S
s=1)
T−1
t=1 )
to the system of inequalities
ki,tDuis(x
i,t
s ) · (xi,ts − xi,Ts ) < µi,ts , t ≤ T − 1;
µi,ts < k
i,T
∑
j 6=i λ
j,T
s
λi,Ts
Duis(x
i,T
s ) · (xi,ts − xi,Ts ), t ≤ T − 1;
µi,t
′
s < µ
i,t
s + k
i,tDuis(x
i,t
s ) · (xi,t′s − xi,ts ), t, t′ ≤ T − 1, with t 6= t′.
6Here, pt = (pts)
S
s=1, x
i,t = (xi,ts )
S
s=1, and e
i,t = (xi,ts )
S
s=1.
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Then, Pareto-improving policies are not identified by the data: there exist,
for every individual and state, state-contingent preferences, u˜is ∈ U , that
1. cannot be ruled out on the basis of observed data: for each observa-
tion, ((qt, pt, (zi,t, xi,t)Ii=1) is a financial markets equilibrium for econ-
omy ((u˜is, e
i,t
s )
S
s=1)
I
i=1); and
2. yield opposite aggregate ex-ante welfare effects for every asset redistri-
bution at observation T : for every (dzi)Ii=1 such that
∑
i dz
i = 0, it
is true that
∑
i dU˜
i,T = −∑i dU i,T .7 Moreover, if there are only two
individuals in the economy, ex-ante welfare effects are (dU˜1,T , dU˜2,T ) =
−(dU2,T , dU1,T ).
Proof. From a solution to the corresponding system of inequalities for each
individual, it follows from lemma 1 (see Appendix 1) that there exist state-
contingent preferences u˜is ∈ U such that:
1. For every observation t ≤ T − 1, the gradient at xi,ts satisfies
Du˜is(x
i,t
s ) =
ki,t
ki,T
Duis(x
i,t
s );
2. In an open neighborhood of xi,Ts , the function satisfies
u˜is(x) =
∑
j 6=i λ
j,T
s
λi,Ts
uis(x).
Fix t ≤ T − 1. Let λ˜i,ts = k
i,t
ki,T
λi,ts , for all i and all s = 0, ..., S. Given
7Here, dU i,T =
∑
s du
i,T
s and dU˜
i,T =
∑
s du˜
i,T
s , where du
i,T
s and du˜
i,T
s are the welfare
effects for individual i, resulting from revenue transfers (rsdzj)Ij=1 at spot equilibrium
(pTs , (x
j,T
s )
I
j=1) in exchange economies (u
j
s, e
j,T
s + rsz
j,T )Ij=1 and (u˜
j
s, e
j,T
s + rsz
j,T )Ij=1,
respectively.
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condition 1 above, we have that
Du˜is(x
i,t
s ) =
ki,t
ki,T
Duis(x
i,t
s ) =
ki,t
ki,T
λi,ts p
t
s = λ˜
i,t
s p
t
s,
while
∑
s
λ˜i,ts rs =
∑
s
ki,t
ki,T
λi,ts rs =
ki,t
ki,T
∑
s
λi,ts rs =
ki,t
ki,T
λi,t0 q
t = λ˜i,t0 q
t,
from where ((qt, pt, (zi,t, xi,t)Ii=1) is an equilibrium for ((u˜
i
s, e
i,t
s )
S
s=1)
I
i=1).
To see that ((qT , pT , (zi,T , xi,T )Ii=1) is an equilibrium for ((u˜
i
s, e
i,T
s )
S
s=1)
I
i=1),
let λ˜i,Ts =
∑
j 6=i λ
j,T
s , for all i and s = 0, ..., S; observe that, by condition 2,
Du˜is(x
i,T
s ) =
∑
j 6=i λ
j,T
s
λi,Ts
Duis(x
i,T
s ) =
∑
j 6=i
λj,Ts p
T
s = λ˜
i,T
s p
T
s ,
while
∑
s
λ˜i,Ts rs =
∑
s
∑
j 6=i
λj,Ts rs =
∑
j 6=i
∑
s
λj,Ts rs =
∑
j 6=i
λj,T0 q
T = λ˜i,T0 q
T .
Now, let ΛTs =
∑
i λ
i,T
s . Since, by condition 2 above, dp
T
s is the same in
exchange economies (uis, e
i,T
s + rsz
i,T )Ii=1 and (u˜
i
s, e
i,T
s + rsz
i,T )Ii=1, it follows
that
du˜i,Ts =
∑
j 6=i λ
j,T
s
λi,Ts
dui,Ts =
(
ΛTs
λi,Ts
− 1
)
dui,Ts
and, hence,
∑
i
du˜i,Ts = Λ
T
s
∑
i
dui,Ts
λi,Ts
−
∑
i
dui,Ts = −
∑
i
dui,Ts ,
8
because
∑
i dz
i = 0 implies
∑
i
dui,Ts
λi,Ts
= 0. It then follows that
∑
i
∑
s
du˜i,Ts =
∑
s
∑
i
du˜i,Ts = −
∑
s
∑
i
dui,Ts = −
∑
i
∑
s
dui,Ts .
In the particular case of two individuals, with j 6= i, in a neighborhood
of xi,Ts , u˜
i
s =
λj,Ts
λi,Ts
uis, while, by successive applications of Roy’s identity,
dui,Ts = λ
i,T
s (dps(e
i,T
s − xi,Ts ) + rsdzi(1, 0, ..., 0))
= λi,Ts (dps(x
j,T
s − ej,Ts )− rsdzj(1, 0, ..., 0))
= −λ
i,T
s
λj,Ts
duj,Ts ,
so
∑
s du˜
i,T
s =
∑
s
λj,Ts
λi,Ts
dui,Ts = −
∑
s du
j,T
s .
The assumption of the proposition guarantees the second order conditions
for the economy we construct, so it implies that the first order conditions are
not only necessary but also sufficient, as we need. This is required because we
need the ex-ante utility functions to be strongly quasiconcave: since we are
assuming additive separability of the ex-ante preferences, it does not suffice
for us to impose strong quasiconcavity of the state-contingent utility func-
tions, and we do require strong concavity; but then, since we construct the
alternative economy using local, noninfinitesimal perturbations of the norm
of the gradient of the original preferences (around the equilibrium consump-
tions for the observation where the policy has to be designed), we cannot
claim that the cardinal property is preserved automatically, and we need to
guarantee it by making up for these perturbations, at all other observed equi-
libria, uniformly across states (notice that, for all i, ki,t is independent of s);
a solution to the system of inequalities suffices for us to be able to preserve
strong quasiconcavity of ex-ante preferences after the perturbations.
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For every individual i, the system introduced by the proposition can be
rewritten as
ki,tλi,ts p
t
s · (xi,ts − xi,Ts ) < µi,ts , all s and t ≤ T − 1;
µi,ts < k
i,T
∑
j 6=i λ
j,T
s p
T
s · (xi,ts − xi,Ts ), all s and t ≤ T − 1;
µi,t
′
s < µ
i,t
s + k
tλi,ts p
t
s · (xi,t′s − xi,ts ), all s and t, t′ ≤ T − 1, with t 6= t′.
This system is a finite set of polynomial inequalities, so the set contain-
ing all the values of the variables that solve it is, by definition, a semi-
algebraic set (see Mishra, 1993). By the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem (see
theorem 8.6.6 in Mishra, 1993), its projection into the space of all variables
but ((ki,t)Tt=1, ((µ
i,t
s )
S
s=1)
T−1
t=1 ) is itself semi-algebraic. This means that, given a
data set, there exists a finite set of polynomial inequalities on the (original)
vectors of marginal utilities of income, for all individuals that suffices for the
implication of the theorem. Since this application of the Tarski-Seidenberg
theorem does not immediately tell us how to find the quantifier-free equiv-
alent assumption (it only tells us that it exists, and that it defines a semi-
algebraic set), it is important to notice that the system introduced by the
theorem is linear on the quantified variables, so the problem of determining
whether it has a solution is equivalent to the first step of a linear program-
ming algorithm, and can be solved in finitely many steps (Blow et al, 2006).
Still, this does not rule out the possibility that there does never exist a solu-
tion to this system, in which case the theorem would be vacuous. Appendix
2 shows that this is not the case: two general conditions in which the system
has a solution are given in the appendix; they show that all the variables in
the system are used, and also that there may be cases in which conditions
are easy to check. For instance, if pTs · (xi,ts − xi,Ts ) ≤ 0, for all s and all
t ≤ T − 1, with strict inequality for some s and t, then the system does have
a solution for individual i. That is, if for each individual i and state s, bundle
xi,Ts is revealed preferred, in the ex-post sense, to every other x
i,t
s , the system
10
has a solution and the data fails to identify Pareto-improving policies; this
is because, in this case, the required perturbations to the gradients are given
around the highest ‘observed’ indifference surfaces and, therefore, pose no
difficulty for strong concavity.
3 Multiple observations and rationalizability
Literature on the empirical content of theories distinguishes two problems:
rationalizability (existence) and identification (uniqueness) of fundamentals
consistent with observed data and theory. Typically, theoretical work con-
centrates on only one of the two problems and, in particular, literature on
identification takes rationalizability for granted (e.g. Ku¨bler et al (2002),
Carvajal and Riascos (2006)). So far we have done the same: we have as-
sumed the existence of a profile of preferences that explains observed data
and have concentrated on finding a second profile which (i) is consistent with
the data too, and (ii) gives welfare effects that are opposite to the ones given
by the original profile, for any policy. This is a nonidentification result, by
(i), which is stronger and of particular interest, because of (ii); yet it still
assumes rationalizability.
One can study the rationalizability and identification problems simulta-
neously: consider the question of whether a data set can be rationalized by
two profiles of preferences with the property that any policy that is Pareto
efficient in one of them makes at least one individual worse off, if the real
preferences are the alternative profile.
In order to answer this question, it suffices that we substitute the as-
sumption that for some known preferences, ((uis)
S
s=1)
I
i=1, it is true that every
(qt, pt, (zi,t, xi,t)Ii=1) is an equilibrium for the economy ((u
i
s, e
i,t
s )
S
s=1)
I
i=1), by
an alternative condition on the data set that suffices to imply the existence
of that first profile of preferences.
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If one assumes that the data set does not directly violate equilibrium
conditions,8 then, using Theorem 2 in Matzkin and Richter (1991), it suffices
that there exist λi,ts > 0 and u
i,t
s , for all individual, state and observation, such
that ui,t
′
s < u
i,t
s + λ
i,t
s p
t
s · (xi,t′s − xi,ts ), whenever t 6= t′, and λi,t0 qt =
∑
s λ
i,t
s rs.
9
The importance of this assumption is that all these conditions, (includ-
ing the ones directly observed on the data) are polynomial inequalities, so by
adding them to the individual systems introduced by proposition 2, we have a
system that guarantees the existence of two profiles of preferences with oppo-
site aggregate ex-ante welfare effects for any asset reallocation. By appealing
again to the Tarski-Seidenberg theorem, it follows that this system can be
replaced by a finite set of conditions purely on the data set. By the results
obtained in appendix 2, it follows that such system is noncontradictory.
Corollary 1. There exists a finite,10 noncontradictory system of polynomial
inequalities that suffices for the existence of state-contingent preferences uis ∈
U and u˜is ∈ U , for all i and s, satisfying that
1. for every t, observed (qt, pt, (zi,t, xi,t)Ii=1) is equilibrium for economy
((uis, e
i,t
s )
S
s=1)
I
i=1;
2. for every t, observed (qt, pt, (zi,t, xi,t)Ii=1) is equilibrium for economy
((u˜is, e
i,t
s )
S
s=1)
I
i=1;
3. for every asset reallocation, (dzi)Ii=1, it is true that
∑
i
∑
s du˜
i,T
s =
−∑i∑s dui,Ts .
Suppose that a planner has available a finite data set of prices, profiles of
endowments and trades. He may ask whether the data set can be explained
by the Walrasian model and, if so, whether it can be used to identify a
8That is, if pts(x
i,t
s − ei,ts ) = rszi,t, qtzi,t = 0,
∑
i x
i,t
s =
∑
i e
i,t
s and
∑
i z
i,t = 0.
9That the T -th observation can be taken as a regular equilibrium follows from Brown
and Sannon (2000).
10In (RA × PS × ((RL++ × RL++)S × RA)I)T .
12
Pareto-improving policy. The corollary says that it may well happen that
the answer to the second part of the question is negative, although the answer
to the first part is affirmative.
4 Long histories of data
Suppose now that, unlike in the previous sections, the economy evolves over
a horizon of T periods, and that what one observes is the evolution of prices
over one competitive equilibrium path. We now argue that in this setting
the non-identification result extends, and that it is stronger in the sense that
it requires no qualification.
Let Σ be a finite tree of events. Denote by ΣT the set of terminal nodes.11
For every node σ, let f(σ) be the set containing all its immediate successors.
Denote by ΣT−1 the set of pre-terminal nodes 12 Let σ0 be the initial node,
and for every σ 6= σ0, let b(σ) denote its immediate predecessor.
State-contingent preferences and endowments for individual i are uiσ ∈ U
and eiσ ∈ RL++. At every non-terminal node σ, there is a finite set, Aσ, of
one-period nume`raire assets: at σ′ ∈ f(σ), the return of asset a ∈ Aσ is raσ′ .
Denote rσ = (r
a
σ)a∈Ab(σ) .
At node σ, commodity prices are pσ and individual consumptions are x
i
σ.
At non-terminal σ, commodity prices are qσ and individual portfolios are z
i
σ.
Suppose that a planner observes an equilibrium (p, q, (xi, zi)Ii=1), and sup-
pose that at a given pre-terminal node σ, an asset redistribution is to be
designed after asset markets have closed (so all that remains in the economy
is one last period of trade in commodities).13 Does the information about all
11For simplicity, it is assumed that all histories leading to a terminal node have the same
number of nodes.
12That is, σ ∈ ΣT−1 if, and only if, f(σ) ⊆ ΣT .
13As before, suppose that for each σ′ ∈ f(σ), (pσ′ , (xiσ′)Ii=1) is a regular equilibrium of
(spot) economy (uiσ′ , e
i
σ′ + rσ′z
i
σ)Ii=1.
13
prices and quantities, past, present and future, and even counterfactual (from
states that did not or will not occur) identify Pareto improving interventions?
Proposition 3. Market information does not identify Pareto improving poli-
cies. That is, let (p, q, (xi, zi)Ii=1) be a financial markets equilibrium for
economy ((uiσ, e
i
σ)σ∈Σ)
I
i=1; there exist individual state-contingent preferences
u˜iσ ∈ U , for all i and all σ, that
1. cannot be ruled out on the basis of observed data: observed (p, q, (xi,
zi)Ii=1) is a financial markets equilibrium for ((u˜
i
σ, e
i
σ)σ∈Σ)
I
i=1 too; and
2. give opposite aggregate welfare effects for any asset reallocation: for ev-
ery preterminal node, σ ∈ ΣT−1, and every asset reallocation (dziσ)Ii=1,14
it is true that
∑
i
∑
σ′∈f(σ)
du˜iσ′ = −
∑
i
∑
σ′∈f(σ)
duiσ′ .
Proof. The argument is similar to the proof of proposition 2, so details are
omitted. For each i, let λiσ be the marginal utility of income at equilibrium
in state σ. Define the new preferences by
u˜iσ(x) =
∑
j 6=i λ
j
σ
λiσ
uiσ(x).
When there are only two consumers, the stronger implication that the
equilibrium information fails to distinguish an economy in which a policy
is Pareto-improving and one in which it is Pareto-impairing still applies.
Importantly, this result requires no qualification, since utility perturbations
14As before,
∑
i dz
i
σ = 0
14
are given globally without compromising strong concavity. An immediate
extension follows.
Corollary 2. Suppose that for every individual i, there are state-independent
preferences ui ∈ U such that state-contingent preferences are uiσ = piiσui
for some piiσ > 0. Let (p, q, (x
i, zi)Ii=1) be a financial markets equilibrium
for (ui, (piiσ, e
i
σ)σ∈Σ)
I
i=1. There exist individual state-independent preferences
u˜i ∈ U and state weights p˜iiσ > 0 that
1. cannot be ruled out on the basis of observed data: observed (p, q, (xi,
zi)Ii=1) is a financial markets equilibrium for (u˜
i, (p˜iiσ, e
i
σ)σ∈Σ)
I
i=1; and
2. give opposite aggregate welfare effects for any asset reallocation: for
every preterminal node, σ ∈ ΣT−1, and every asset reallocation (dzi)Ii=1,
it is true that 15
∑
i
∑
σ′∈f(σ)
p˜iiσ′du˜
i
σ′ = −
∑
i
∑
σ′∈f(σ)
piiσ′du
i
σ′ .
Proof. Define λiσ as in the previous proof, and let u˜
i = ui and
p˜iiσ =
∑
j 6=i λ
j
σ
λiσ
piiσ.
5 Concluding remarks
If an economy is nonstationary, observation of all market information does
not suffice to identify Pareto-improving policies. There exists a profile of
15Here, duiσ− and du˜iσ′) are, respectively, individual i’s welfare effects resulting from
revenue transfer (rσ′dzj)Ij=1, at spot equilibrium (pσ′ , (x
j
σ′)
I
j=1), in exchange economies
(uj , ejσ′ + rσ′z
j(1, 0, ..., 0))Ij=1 and (u˜
j , ejσ′ + rσ′z
j(1, 0, ..., 0))Ij=1.
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preferences which would have yielded the exact same equilibrium information,
but for which any reallocation policy would have opposite effects: if it is
Pareto-improving in the real economy, there is at least one individual who is
made worse off in the other economy. The intuition is that one equilibrium
is not enough to pin down the vector of marginal utilities of income at the
terminal nodes for each individual. One can shuﬄe and add these vectors
across individuals and still respect observed market behavior. The fact that
one cannot rule out these different profiles of marginal utilities is relevant
when they are not collinear, which is the condition under which Pareto-
improving reallocations exist in the first place. The result is then most
meaningful: the same feature of the equilibrium that explains the existence
of Pareto-improving policies implies that it is impossible to identify one such
policy.
When the data set is a series of equilibrium prices and endowments
for a two-period economy, the problem is more restrictive and the non-
identification results are weakened. This is so, because the shuﬄing and
addition of marginal utilities of income implies non-infinitesimal perturba-
tions to the (norm of the gradient of) utility functions at the points where
policy is to be attempted. When multiple equilibria have to be rationalized,
these perturbations must be local. But then, since we have additively sep-
arable preferences, the necessity to guarantee concavity weakens the result.
In this paper, we guarantee concavity via a system similar to Afriat inequal-
ities. It follows that there do exist conditions on the data under which one
can ensure the existence of multiple rationalizations yielding different welfare
effects for any policy.
In both settings, when identification fails, market performance is less
questionable on grounds of its inefficiency. Granted, there may be Pareto-
improving policies, but market information does not suffice for their design.
Open questions remain: our setting does not consider Markovian econo-
16
mies; we do not consider policies other than asset reallocation; by the quali-
fication of the result in the case of multiple observations, our results cannot
say what happens as one increases, asymptotically, the number of observa-
tions in a neighborhood of the equilibrium where policy is to be designed;
finally, our results do not say whether or not a mechanism can be designed
in order to elicit information about the consumers’ preferences.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Non-infinitesimal perturbation of a strongly
concave function
Lemma 1. Fix u ∈ U , Λ ∈ R++ and take a finite sequence (xt)Tt=1 in RL+,
such that xt 6= xt′ for t 6= t′. Let ((kt > 0)Tt=1, (µt)T−1t=1 ) solve the system
ktDu(xt) · (xt − xT ) < µt, all t ≤ T − 1;
µt < kTΛDu(xT ) · (xt − xT ), all t ≤ T − 1;
µt
′
< µt + ktDu(xt) · (xt′ − xt), all t, t′ ≤ T − 1, with t 6= t′.
There exists u˜ ∈ U such that:
1. for every t ≤ T − 1, Du˜(xt) = kt
kT
Du(xt);
2. there exists ² > 0 such that, for all x ∈ B²(xT ), u˜(x) = Λu(x).
Proof. For every t ≤ T − 1, define vt = Λu(xT ) + µt
kT
. By construction,
Λu(xT ) < vt + k
t
kT
Du(xt) · (xT − xt), all t ≤ T − 1;
vt < Λu(xT ) + ΛDu(xT ) · (xt − xT ), all t ≤ T − 1;
vt
′
< vt + k
t
kT
Du(xt) · (xt′ − xt), all t, t′ ≤ T − 1, with t 6= t′.
As in Matzkin and Richter (1991), define h : RL → R+, as h(x) =
√‖x‖2 + 1
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−1. Function h is C2 and strongly convex, satisfies that h(x) = 0 only for
x = 0, and the value of all its partial derivatives always lies in [0, 1).
Since T is finite, there exists γ > 0 such that
Λu(xT ) < vt +
kt
kT
Du(xt) · (xT − xt)− γh(xT − xt),
and
vt
′
< vt +
kt
kT
Du(xt) · (xt′ − xt)− γh(xt′ − xt),
for all t, t′ ≤ T − 1, t 6= t′. Further, restrict γ to
0 < γ < min
l≤L,t≤T−1
kt
kT
∂u
∂xl
(xt).
Now, for each t ≤ T − 1, define φt : RL → R by
φt(x) = u
t +
kt
kT
Du(xt) · (x− xt)− γh(x− xt),
while φT : RL → R is given by φT (x) = Λu(x). Notice that every φt function
is strictly concave, whereas, for each t ≤ T − 1 and every l ∈ {1, ..., L},
∂φt
∂xl
(x) =
kt
kT
∂u
∂xl
(xt)− γ ∂h
∂xl
(x− xt) > k
t
kT
∂u
∂xl
(xt)− γ > 0.
Define u˜ : RL+ → R by u˜(x) = min{φ1(x), ..., φT (x)}. Function u˜ is
continuous, strongly concave, strictly monotone and differentiable almost
everywhere. Differentiability everywhere can be obtained as in Chiappori
and Rochet (1987). By continuity, for each t there exists ²t > 0 such that,
for all x ∈ B²t(xt), u(x) = φt(x).
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Appendix 2: Solutions to the system in Proposition 2
Some general cases in which the system introduced in proposition 2 has a
solution are presented here.
Fix an individual, i, and define Λts =
∑
j 6=i
λj,ts
λi,ts
. For the sake of simplicity,
ignore, from now on, the superindex i. Define
M ts = {t′ ≤ T − 1 : Dus(xts) · (xt
′
s − xts) < 0}
and
P ts = {t′ ≤ T − 1 : Dus(xts) · (xt
′
s − xts) > 0}.
Perturbation to the gradients at all t
Define
Mt = {s : Dus(xts) · (xTs − xts) < 0},
Pt = {s : Dus(xts) · (xTs − xts) > 0},
M = {(s, t) : t ≤ T − 1 ∧Dus(xTs )(xTs − xts) < 0},
P = {(s, t) : t ≤ T − 1 ∧Dus(xTs )(xTs − xts) > 0},
and denote
Lts = max
t′∈P ts
Λt
′
s (us(x
t′
s )− us(xTs ))− Λts(us(xts)− us(xTs ))
Dus(xts) · (xt′s − xts)
,
U ts = min
t′∈Mts
Λt
′
s (us(x
t′
s )− us(xTs ))− Λts(us(xts)− us(xTs ))
Dus(xts) · (xt′s − xts)
,
Lt = maxs∈Mt Λts, Ut = mins∈Pt Λts,U = min(s,t)∈M
Λts
ΛTs
, and L = max(s,t)∈P
Λts
ΛTs
.
Suppose that
1. L ≤ U;
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2. for all t ≤ T − 1 and all s, M ts ∪ P ts = {1, ..., T − 1};
3. for all t, [Lt,Ut] ∩⋂s(Lts, U ts) 6= ∅.
and let
1. kT ∈ [L,U];
2. for all t ≤ T − 1 and all s, µts = Λts(us(xts)− us(xTs ));
3. for all t, kt ∈ [Lt,Ut] ∩⋂s(Lts, U ts).
By strong concavity, us(x
t′
s ) < us(x
t
s) +Dus(x
t
s) · (xt′s − xts), for all s and
all t, t′ ≤ T , t 6= t′.
Fix s and t ≤ T−1. Since Λts > 0, we have that ΛtsDus(xts)·(xts−xTs ) < µts.
Then: ifDus(x
t
s)·(xTs −xts) < 0, since kt ≥ Λts, then µts > ktDus(xts)·(xts−xTs );
if Dus(x
t
s) · (xTs − xts) > 0, since kt ≤ Λts, then µts > ktDus(xts) · (xts − xTs ); if,
alternatively, Dus(x
t
s) · (xTs − xts) = 0, then µts > 0 = ktDus(xts) · (xts − xTs ).
This yields the first equation of the system.
Again, since Λts > 0, we have that µ
t
s < Λ
t
sDus(x
T
s ) · (xts − xTs ). Then: if
Dus(x
T
s ) ·(xts−xTs ) > 0, since kT ≥ Λ
t
s
ΛTs
, then µts < k
TΛTsDus(x
T
s ) ·(xts−xTs ); if
Dus(x
T
s )·(xts−xTs ) < 0, since kT ≤ Λ
t
s
ΛTs
, then µts < k
TΛTsDus(x
T
s )·(xts−xTs ); if,
alternatively, Dus(x
T
s )·(xts−xTs ) = 0, then µts < 0 = kTΛTsDus(xTs )·(xts−xTs ).
This yields the second equation of the system.
Now, fix s and t, t′ ≤ T − 1, t 6= t′. If Dus(xts) · (xt′s − xts) > 0, since
kt >
Λt
′
s (us(x
t′
s − us(xTs ))− Λts(us(xts − us(xTs ))
Dus(xts) · (xt′s − xts)
,
it follows by construction that µt
′
s < µ
t
s + k
tDus(x
t
s) · (xt′s − xts). If, on the
other hand, Dus(x
t
s) · (xt′s − xts) < 0, since
kt <
Λt
′
s (us(x
t′
s − us(xTs ))− Λts(us(xts − us(xTs ))
Dus(xts) · (xt′s − xts)
,
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it follows again that µt
′
s < µ
t
s + k
tDus(x
t
s) · (xt′s − xts). Finally, notice that
Dus(x
t
s) · (xt′s − xts) = 0 does not occur, by assumption. This yields the third
condition of the system.
Perturbation to the gradients at T only
Suppose that there are s and s′ such that P Ts 6= ∅ and MTs 6= ∅, and denote
that
L = max
s:PTs 6=∅
max
t∈PTs
us(x
t
s)− us(xTs )
ΛTsDus(x
T
s ) · (xts − xTs )
and
U = min
s:MTs 6=∅
min
t∈MTs
us(x
t
s)− us(xTs )
ΛTsDus(x
T
s ) · (xts − xTs )
.
Suppose that L < U . Let
1. kT ∈ (max{0, L}, U);
2. for all t ≤ T − 1 and all s, let µts = us(xts)− us(xTs );
3. for all t, kt = 1.
Using strong concavity, the first and third conditions of the system are
immediate. Now, fix s and t ≤ T − 1. If Dus(xTs ) · (xts − xTs ) > 0, then
kT >
us(x
t
s)− us(xTs )
ΛTsDus(x
T
s ) · (xts − xTs )
,
so µts < k
TΛTsDus(x
T
s ) · (xts − xTs ). If Dus(xTs ) · (xts − xTs ) < 0, then
kT <
us(x
t
s)− us(xTs )
ΛTsDus(x
T
s ) · (xts − xTs )
so µts < k
TΛTsDus(x
T
s ) · (xts − xTs ). Finally, if Dus(xTs ) · (xts − xTs ) = 0, then
us(x
t
s) < us(x
T
s ), so µ
t
s = us(x
t
s) − us(xTs ) < 0 = kTΛTsDus(xTs ) · (xts − xTs ).
This yields the second condition of the system.
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Notice that, by construction, for this case to apply it suffices that us(x
t
s) ≤
us(x
T
s ) whenever Dus(x
T
s ) · (xts − xTs ) > 0. Notice also that the solution can
easily be given if P Ts = ∅, for all s, but MTs′ 6= ∅ for some s′, or if MTs = ∅,
for all s, but P Ts′ 6= ∅ for some s′.
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